Of the three deputy leaders of the Taliban, the head of its political office in Doha, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, represents the benign face of the organisation. Soon after Kabul was taken, he said that the real test of the Taliban had begun. His measured restraint was reflected by Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid at his first press conference on August 17. The show of moderation by the Taliban is for getting both recognition and continued foreign aid. Mujahid’s artful statements may win national and international acceptability, provided its actions conform to its promise of responsible behaviour.
The general assumption is that the Taliban 2.0 is an inward-looking and nationalistic Afghan organisation, intent on expelling the foreign invader and restoring Afghanistan to its traditional values and orientation.
The narrative presented by Mujahid is that the new Taliban has learnt from its past excesses and is more moderate. If not modern, it is not medieval in outlook, even if guided by the Sharia Law. He sought to whitewash the excesses (that include wanton killings, targeted assassinations, and bombings) by suggesting that ‘damages,’ if they occurred, were unintentional. Such a narrative is a PR exercise. Coercion is critical to the Taliban consolidating its hold on power, as shown by its strong response to the national flag waving protests in some Afghan towns. These were promptly put down using firearms.
The Taliban of today is said to have gained from adversity. In the 1990s, it had taken the Taliban just two years to establish the Islamic Emirate. After 2001, its return to power took two decades. On ideology and belief, Mujahid said there is no difference between the old and new Taliban. But on experience, maturity, and insight, he said there was a change.
What is apparent is the new veneer – much more effective use of public relations tools and its messages of fair treatment of the civilian population and reasonable behaviour.
ALSO READ: Why the Taliban Desperately Need PR This Time, Something They Hated in the 1990s
The Pakistan Connection
An aspect that has remained a constant for Taliban 1.0 and 2.0 is its close links with the Pakistan establishment, particularly the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). If anything, that link today is stronger than ever. The Taliban could never have returned to Afghanistan and achieved victory without the shelter and support it got from Pakistan. Given its dependence on the ISI, the Taliban will be powerless against what veteran journalist Anand Sahay calls the “Pakistani death squads” hunting down perceived enemies of Pakistan present in Afghanistan.
Former president Hamid Karzai told Ahmed Rashid – recounted in the latter’s book, Descent into Chaos – that when he had first met the Taliban leaders in 1994, he was so impressed that he gave them money and weapons, believing they would bring law and order to Afghanistan and establish a government by consultation. At that point, Mullah Omar had offered to appoint Karzai as the Taliban envoy to the United Nations. When Karzai realised that the Taliban was “taken over by the ISI and became a proxy,” he distanced himself.
Links with Other Islamist Terror Groups
US troops went to Afghanistan to combat terrorists with a global reach and the states that harboured them. The Taliban had allowed Al-Qaeda to operate from Afghan soil. The International Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders met in Kandahar on February 23, 1998. The Front included Al-Qaeda, and the Egyptian Jihad Group (Jamaat-ul-Jihad), the Egyptian Armed Islamic Group (Gama’a al-Islamiya), the Pakistan Scholars/Ulema Society (Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan), the Partisans Movement in Kashmir (Harkat-ul-Ansar), and the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh.
Soon thereafter, Osama bin Laden announced the creation of a larger organisation, the International Islamic Front for Jihad against America and Israel on May 28, 1998. Besides three organisations from Egypt, two from Uzbekistan, one from Xinjiang, and the Abu Sayyaf group from Southern Philippines, several Pakistan-based Islamist organisations joined this Front, including the Markaz Dawa Al Irshad, its militant wing, the Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, and the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, as also, its militant wing, the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.
When the US Embassies in East Africa were bombed, in reprisal US cruise missiles targeted an Al-Qaeda training camp near Khost in September 1998. Alerted, Osama bin Laden had escaped a few hours earlier. Those who perished were Indian terrorists from Kashmir and their ISI trainers. Terrorist groups from virtually all of Afghanistan’s contiguous territories have fought under the Taliban’s banner, and they will likely find a safe haven in the new Islamic Emirate. The latest report of the United Nations Security Council Sanctions Committee speaks of the continuing close connection of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.
Irrespective of their different nomenclature and separate franchises, the terrorist networks that operate in Afghanistan, with the possible exception of the Daesh, remain mutually supportive of each other. During the rise of Taliban 1.0 in 1994-96, there was not one case of a suicide bombing. Now, all of these groups use improvised explosive devices and suicide bombings. They have been further radicalised. Their changing orientation is especially marked in the tactics deployed by the Taliban post-2001. Mullah Omar was against wanton attacks on civilians. Not so the present military leaders of the Taliban. Attacks on girls’ schools and maternity hospitals have been part of the Taliban’s tactics. So too the mutilation and dismembering of already dead opponents.
Uncertainty of Taliban’s Actions
The Taliban’s equivocatory promises are at variance with its actions. On gender equality, the Taliban is promising respect for women’s rights within the framework of Islamic law. Despite this assurance, women have simply disappeared from sight in Afghan cities. Though prominently present as news anchors on Tolo TV, the most popular privately-run Afghan television channel, women anchors have been discouraged from appearing on government channels. Photographs of women are being effaced from billboards and shopfronts. Beauty parlours, giving employment and joy to thousands of women, have been shut down. There is news of forced marriages, disappearances, and abductions of women and young girls.
Afghans want to embrace normalcy and forget the Taliban legacy of revenge killings and the brute suppression of rights. Mujahid said in his press conference that the Taliban has “pardoned everyone” and “will not take revenge against anyone.” The accounts filtering through are to the contrary. Its cadres are going door-to-door, even in Kabul, chalk-marking houses, perhaps for appropriate treatment in due course. The Taliban is visibly showing its intolerance for those with independent thought. Especially targeted are civil society activists, shapers of opinion, such as journalists and public intellectuals, and those who worked for foreign embassies and consulates.
Speaking in the name of the Islamic Emirate, Mujahid paradoxically said that the Taliban wants to establish a government that includes all sides. The coming weeks will show the complexion of the new Taliban regime and its likely direction. If it shows restraint and is committed to what it promises, if the transition is smooth, if the new government is indeed inclusive, if the Indian Embassy and Consulates are able to function, and if Indian terrorist groups are not encouraged, it will augur well. If not, the early promise of the Taliban 2.0 will remain a chimaera.
Read all the Latest News, Breaking News and Assembly Elections Live Updates here.
Comments
0 comment