A sequel of sorts to ‘The Spy Chronicles’ (Harper & Collins, 2018), the book ‘Covert: The Psychology of War and Peace’ has emerged from the peregrinations of a group of psychoanalysts abroad, considered experts in the psychology of war and peacemaking. The exercise started in August 2021. Lt Gen (retd) Asad Durrani and A.S. Dulat were brought together for discussions, through personal and Zoom meetings, by Dr Neil Krishan Aggarwal, Professor of Clinical Psychiatry at Columbia University, USA under benevolent prodding from Dr Chuck Strozier (Professor of History at John Jay College of Criminology, University of New York) and Lord John Alderdice (experienced negotiator in Irish Peace process), both of whom had been sufficiently taken by the ‘The Spy Chronicles’ to pursue this endeavour.
Scholarship on the psychology of peacemaking has taken into account perspectives of participants in Track II negotiations earlier, but never before have experts at the highest levels of intelligence agreed to share their reflections on the technical aspects of peacemaking in such a candid, laid-back and mature manner.
As spelt out by Dr Aggarwal, who is one of three co-authors, this book sits at the intersection of three disciplines: cultural psychiatry, psychiatric anthropology and psychology, where the effort focuses on two main areas: i) to understand conflict, intelligence and peacemaking from the psychoanalyst’s perspective and ii) offer specific, practical strategies, which could perhaps be a guide for future peace-building between India and Pakistan.
Starting from what happened after The Spy Chronicles was published, the book examines how the two authors were affected in terms of “self-perception, self-esteem, trust, stress, vulnerability and perceptions of others.” It explores in some detail, the childhood, adolescent and early adulthood experiences of both men, their professional trajectories, entry into intelligence work and eventual transition from seeing each other as enemies to allies in peacemaking. The book then ‘dives into’ cultural, ethnic, religious and regional identities of Durrani and Dulat. Tracing the sources of these traits and their evolution in life, respectively as Pakistani and Indian, an effort is made to examine how and why differences and similarities here matter when discussing peace.
Candid questions are asked in a separate chapter on how both Dulat and Durrani viewed their respective foreign policy establishments. In the process, Aggarwal takes a close look at four main domains of related clinical psychology – personality traits, drives and motivations, skills and abilities and biological events – which shaped the responses of these two spooks. Finally, the authors assess what could be the next steps, perhaps incremental or minimally realistic, in this seemingly intractable conflict.
To digress slightly, though Durrani and Dulat were almost of the same age, neither The Spy Chronicles nor this book emphasises that they headed their respective intelligence organisations at different periods of history with General Durrani’s tenure preceding Dulat’s by almost nine years. Durrani was an artillery officer with no prior intelligence experience, while Dulat was a career Intelligence officer from the Indian Police Service who joined the Intelligence Bureau.
Also, the circumstances of their ascension were quite different. Gen Durrani had been a protégé of Gen Aslam Beg as a Brigadier. Gen Beg had been sidelined for long years in his army career. He was grudgingly brought in as Vice Chief by Gen Zia Ul-Haq in sufferance to Prime Minister Junejo’s requests. Destiny propelled Beg to prominence as Army Chief after the catastrophic plane crash of August 17, 1988, which saw Zia, his Intelligence czar of the Afghan years, Gen Akhtar Abdul Rehman and his Chief of General Staff, Lt Gen Iftikhar die in one stroke. Beg had to contend with an imperious and interfering bureaucrat, Ghulam Ishaq Khan as President and an Army generally suspicious of the popularly resurgent Benazir Bhutto as Prime Minister. A retired Intelligence Chief, Gen Kallue, brought in by Benazir was found out of his depth. Beg had the ambitious Hamid Gul breathing down his neck as ISI chief, threatening to step into his shoes. The Jalalabad fiasco presented Beg (and Benazir) an opportunity to ease out Hamid Gul, albeit with difficulty, to the Second Corps command in Multan. Beg brought in Durrani in this backdrop, first in military intelligence and then as the ISI Chief.
The Mehrangate scandal unfolded in September 1990. As a hapless Director-General of the ISI, Durrani had to carry out his chief’s bidding to distribute funds to the political opposition led by Nawaz Sharif. Gen Durrani honestly laid bare the plot in a ‘for your eyes only’ note to the PM and in an affidavit later, in the Asghar Khan court case, which Benazir Bhutto saw. ‘Asad Saab’ had to face compulsory retirement. In his book, ‘Pakistan Adrift’, Durrani ruefully admits he need not have been so frank then, especially as Aslam Beg did not come to his defence.
Dulat joined RAW at a time when the organisation’s esteem was at a rather low ebb, in the eyes of our civilian political masters then (1999). His batchmate, Shyamal Datta, was the chief of the Intelligence Bureau (IB) at that time. Dulat’s appointment marked the first instance of a senior IB officer taking over as RAW chief after the two services were bifurcated in 1968. As Dulat acknowledges, his first few months in RAW were spent navigating the organisation, familiarising himself with its officers, and its workings.
Also, Dulat and Durrani met for the first time after both had retired, in Track II events, not while in service, when pressures and perspectives could have been regulated by different or more pressing national interests. Serving RAW and ISI chiefs used to meet even before, under possible prodding from Western interlocutors. This practice was discontinued for some time but it revived sporadically afterwards, during the bilateral ‘detente years of 2004-2008’. It is not known if it continues now.
As the book evolves, Dr Aggarwal asks incisive questions of Durrani and Dulat about different facets of their stint in intelligence and how these experiences influenced their perspectives on peacemaking. Religious proclivities or inclinations of either were probed to determine if at all these coloured their responses. Both answered in the negative. Gen Durrani believed in “making his own briefs and charting his own course”, albeit after taking inputs from subordinates. He had to “go against conventional wisdom, tradition and laid down norms.” In retrospect, he opines, “thinking within establishment” suggested that “police officers are usually cut out to be better intelligence hands than military men”, because they lived among people, whereas “the military was isolated from the general public.” He confessed to often taking serious problems home, neglecting family, while Dulat reveals that he never took problems home though he could not always hide distress at setbacks, like after the IC 814 hijacking, in December end, 1999. Families were found to be usually supportive and understanding of the high tensions the jobs involved, howsoever well camouflaged.
Gen. Durrani’s transition to post-retirement peacemaking and Track II happened specifically after his invitation to the Oslo Dialogue in Norway in 2010, where Afghanistan figured majorly in experts’ analyses. Dulat’s exposure continued after his post-retirement stint in the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), mainly because of his expertise and experience in handling contacts in Kashmir. Both found patience to be a major virtue in the transition to their role as peacemakers – listening to others endlessly, eschewing irritation at ‘unbearable self-righteousness’ at times, especially of diplomats on both sides. Empathy was very important and progress, even piecemeal, had to be persevered with.
Chapter IV examines ‘making peace can be as hard as war: why some initiatives succeed and others fail’. It takes a detailed look at experiences during recent Indo-Pakistani conflicts. Though Dulat believes Track II was helpful to Track I, he often “came away with a feeling that neither side got what they should have” as “the Pakistanis are smarter than us.” Participants took something back home, learning useful traits about their counterparts but nothing institutionally beneficial resulted in the long run. Dulat believes, “signals from our side” were the problem. Where positive vibes happened, “the singer was more important than the song.” Pakistanis were deterred by the overwhelming perception which came across from their Indian interlocutors, as to “what can Pakistan give us.” Durrani holds that “the value of Track II is always overestimated” as “State institutions were not very interested.” “South Block has no soft corner for peace with Pakistan.”
On one occasion, a “select group of former ambassadors or high commissioners to India invited by Sati Lambah were read the riot act by Doval (then our new NSA)”, who “walked away without shaking hands” (a reference to an incident in 2014). The General goes on to explain to Aggarwal that, under the circumstances, it would be stupid for Pakistanis to “give the message that it was dying for peace.” While Indians knew, they could survive without talking, even without peaceful relations… the only good message “we (Pakistan) can give is, we are ready (for talks) whenever you are.” Breaking the ice helped, nevertheless. Some success over the opening of the Kartarpur Corridor is discussed here.
The final chapter tries to make ‘an honest assessment of future peacemaking’. Relying on modern updates on psychology’s theory of transference, wherein roles or positions can be assigned in advance or inter-changed, difficult questions were posed to both spymasters: “why peacemaking repeatedly failed between India and Pakistan”, “How to overcome barriers to peacemaking”, what were chances for a “befitting ending, with no one getting what they want but reconciling to live with it”. Despite all the optimism visible at the beginning, deliberations which predictably focused more on Kashmir saw the group reaching a ‘more pessimistic’, ‘darker’ though ‘accurate’ conclusion.
Gen Durrani was of the view that Kashmiris were “people proud of their past, they would continue to fight until their grievances were addressed.” If India “rode roughshod”, consequences – militancy, could not be ascribed to “acts of ours (Pakistan).” After August 2019, from the point of Pakistani ‘realpolitik’, restoration of statehood could only be seen as “a step forward in a relative sense, not as a concession to them.” Dulat, on the other hand, favoured putting the Kashmir issue on ‘backburner’, more “to create hope where there is none”. It is perplexing to the informed reader though, why he puts so much faith in the possible role former PM Imran Khan, a ‘master of U-turns’ (reviewer’s italics) could ever play or be trusted with, in this exercise.
There is an almost frenetic look at theories of conflict resolution here by the eager psychoanalyst, Dr Neil Aggarwal. He emphasises how over time, “each society needs to change its goals, its beliefs about the adversary and about itself”. In practical terms though, nothing better than a ‘revived composite dialogue’ process is suggested as a possible way forward. Joint efforts to combat drug trafficking and religious tourism are seen as initiatives worth considering.
Whatever the outcome of elections in India, the book serves as a timely reminder to re-look in a constructive manner at the entire gamut of Track II and Track I negotiations and the plethora of issues in this complex web of Indo-Pak relations.
The writer is a former special secretary, Cabinet Secretariat. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely that of the author. They do not necessarily reflect News18’s views.
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